22 Aug 2018 ID:2576 Переглядів:7,428
The Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the current state, is unable to defend Ukraine’s national interests at sea and to contain aggression from the sea. The vast majority of ships and vessels of our Navy are obsolete and have served the established terms of use. So, we stand at the beginning of the restoration of our power at sea. Creating modern and effective Navy is a long-term task with many unknowns.
What is the path to development?
Currently, the Navy is working with the specialists of the United States, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, NGOs, volunteers and non-governmental organizations of Ukraine to develop the Navy Development Strategy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by 2035. The views of the Navy Command for the restoration of the Ukrainian Navy are set out in the same article on the website of the Navy.
Are the following approaches to the construction of the fleet correct, can be checked by considering the history of the development of modern fleets of the advanced countries of the world.
We are not the first to face the choice of building a new fleet. And in this sense it is interesting to analyze the experience of building modern navies of Sweden.
Given the scope of the article, I will ignore the development of mine-protective forces, naval aviation, coastal rocket-artillery troops, landing forces, marines, security and education.
In the 1950s, the situation around Sweden changed dramatically. Just ended the Second World War. Europe restored the country destroyed by war. Sweden’s export-oriented economy has undergone a crisis. At the same time, the Cold War unfolded in the world. The Soviet Union conducted aggressive policies and expanded its armed forces and dynamically built the modern Navy.
Changed and weapons appeared: jets, nuclear weapons, submarines of the new generation, the first anti-ship missiles.
Under such conditions, the relatively large fleet of Sweden quickly became obsolete and ceased to meet the requirements of state defense from a real and aggressive adversary.
In addition, maintaining a numerical fleet was costly.
During the first half of the 1850s, ships from the Navy were excluded and decommissioned, which were built up to the 1930s and did not have a prospect of further service. From the mid-1950s, the Swedes began building a series of destroyers of types of Halland and Östergötland submarines of the type Hajen and torpedo boats of the type Plejad (built in Germany).
In 1957, the Navy of Sweden had the following main warships:
2 light cruisers;
23 destroyers;
25 submarines;
18 torpedo boats
But in 1957, the Swedish Armed Forces leadership came to the conclusion that cruisers and destroyers are vulnerable to air strikes and are not able to act effectively against Soviet ships. After a long debate, the Swedish Parliament adopted a military budget with a significant reduction in shipbuilding costs.
As a result, the program for the construction of new destroyers was curtailed, but the two mortgaged destroyers nevertheless completed.
Over the next two years, the Navy Commander has urgently developed and presented to the Parliament the Marine Development Plan Marine Plan 60 with a shipbuilding and submarine plan for 1967. According to the concept, anticipation of the enemy in the distant zone by forces of submarines and aviation, in the near zone by corvette of new types, rocket boats and mines, in the coastal zone with torpedo boats, coastal missile complexes and artillery, as well as the imposition of sea barriers were anticipated. Available cruisers and destroyers remained in the operational construction of the fleet, but planned their gradual withdrawal from the military.
After examining the naval command of the Navy in 1963, the Parliament approved the shipbuilding program, but excluding it from the construction of new type of corvets and reduced the number of new boats, tralshches and submarines.
Under this program, in the 1960s and 1970s, 18 torpedo boats were built in Sweden (6 Spica type and 12 Norrköping (Spica II), 14 submarines (6 Draken type, 5 type Sjöormen, 3 type Näcken), 3 mine protectors
, 12 basic combines of the Arkö type, 7 Fiskeminsvepare tralshils, as well as a significant number of landing and patrol boats.
Understanding the lack of forces to address the main tasks of the Navy, the navy command of Sweden focused on the development of high-tech weapons. Trying to succeed at the expense of not quantity, but quality. With advanced and advanced industry, the Swedes have made significant progress in the development of anti-ship missiles, self-propelled torpedoes, hydroacoustic stations, radio electronic information processing (future automated control systems), and the development of diesel submarines.
Many efforts have been made to create a single closed-loop engine for submarines.
In 1977, the Navy of Sweden had in its composition:
10 destroyers and frigates (2 types of Halland with PKR Rb 08, 4 type Östergötland with SeaCar, 2 type Öland and 2 Visby type frigates)
16 submarines (4 Hajen types, 6 Draken, 5 Type Sjöormen, 1 Type Näcken and 2 in construction)
29 torpedo boats (6 type Spica I, 12 type Spica II and 11 type Plejad)
So, since the adoption of the Marinplan 60 concept, Sweden has withdrawn 2 cruisers from the fleet, 16 destroyers and introduced 18 new torpedo boats into the fleet.
Submarines continued to be built in series of 4-6 units, with a gradual withdrawal from the outdated types.
But the Navy of Sweden, built on the concept of ‘Marinplan 60’, had two very significant drawbacks.
The first of these was weak strike capabilities due to the lack of rocket boats. Armed with the first Swedish anti-ship rocket Rb 08, according to its mass-dimensional characteristics could not be placed on small carriers, so in 1965, these missiles were installed only on two destroyers such as Halland (incidentally, they became the first, after the Soviet ships of this class, which received missile weapons). Also, the rocket missile troops were armed with Rb 08 missiles. For the aviation, in 1958, an anti-ship missile Rb 04 was developed. It became the basis of a rocket for future missile boats – RBS-15, but the development of this missile lasted more than 20 years and was completed only in 1985. Thus, almost 15 years ago, the Navy did not have on-board missile defense missiles, with the exception of two Halland destroyers.
Another disadvantage of the Navy of Sweden was a weak anti-submarine defense. The tasks of the PWO were relied on all warships – destroyers, torpedo boats, minesweepers, submarines, but, with the exception of the latter, Swedish ships and boats did not have effective means of detecting submarines. The inadequacy of the Swedish Navy’s ability to carry out an anti-submarine struggle has shown an incident with the Soviet submarine S-363. Early in the morning on October 28, 1981, the Swedes saw the Soviet submarine, which sailed on the ground 2 kilometers from the main car park of the Karlsrujn. The day before, on October 27, in the same area Swedes were testing the latest torpedoes. In fact, the Navy of Sweden did not find a long passage of the Soviet submarine with Swedish territorial waters right up to the main base of the Swedish fleet! In the USSR Navy, this boat was mockingly nicknamed the ‘Swedish Komsomol’, and the Swedes again took urgent measures to increase the capabilities of the Navy. Especially since the beginning of the 80-ies the situation in the Baltic Sea changed again and not in their favor.
During the 1960s and 70s the main enemy of the Navy of Sweden, the Baltic Fleet of the USSR, made a qualitative leap and increased quantitatively. During this period, its combat composition included 8 submarines with cruise missiles, 12 class frigate missiles, 27 anti-submarine ships of the corvette class, 8 rocket ships of the class corvette and more than 30 rocket boats. Armed Forces were adopted anti-ship missiles for submarines, ships and aircraft. There were rocket launchers, sea attack aircraft, anti-submarine planes and helicopters.
The capabilities of the marine intelligence and targeting system have increased.
The navies of Sweden again find themselves in a situation where they can not solve the tasks. Submarines remained the only striking force at sea, but their activity was considerably limited by a powerful PFM of a likely enemy. Missile boats lacked to increase the impact potential. And for the creation of effective anti-submarine defense – anti-submarine ships (corvets and frigates). Coverage of forces in the sea from air strikes was partly solved by the coastal air defense system and air force air force.
In order to address the problem of the build-up of the naval strike forces, given that the Swedish anti-ship missile for boats had not yet been set up, the command of the fleet in 1973 offered proposals to the Parliament on the allocation of funds for the construction of missile boats in Norway. The Parliament approved proposals and during the years 1978-82, a series of 16 rocket boats of the type Hugin with the PKK Penguin was built in Norway.
As for anti-submarine defense, it was only after the Soviet submarine incident that the Government and Parliament managed to persuade the Government and Parliament to allocate additional funds for the development and construction of an anti-submarine ship. Taking into account the shortage of time, the Ytattack-81 project (the extension of the Spica boat line with increased autonomy and seaworthiness) was used as the basis for the future anti-ship ship. A year later, in 1982, the project was ready and the construction of the first corps began.
Understanding the disadvantages of their Navy, the Swedes used as much as possible the allocated resource to enhance the shock and anti-submarine capabilities of the fleet. Built in 1984, Stockholm and Malmö were equipped with 6 anti-ship missiles RBS15, one 57mm artillery unit ‘Beaufort’, four 400-mm torpedoes, radar detecting air and surface targets, towing GAS, means of REB, automated control system.
Also, instead of the SCR it was possible to install 533-mm torpedoes and RBU ELMA.
They were actually multi-purpose ships and were classified by the Swedes as a ‘coastal corvette’.
The Swedish fleet received efficient and versatile ships with large firepower and anti-submarine weapons. However, they were designed in an emergency manner, they were not completely satisfied with the Swedes, on anti-submarine capabilities. Therefore, practically without interruption, the design of a new series of corvets was started.
In 1981-84, all of the Norrköping (Spica II) boats during the upgrade received 8 RBS15 anti-ship missiles each and were reclassified in the missile.
Between 1987 and 1993, 4 Globe-type corvette ships were built and handed over to the fleet. They had a displacement of 425 tons, were equipped with 8 PCR RBS15, 57 and 40 mm artillery units ‘Beaufort’, four 400-mm torpedoes, ELMA RBU, radar detectors for air and surface purposes, submarine and towed GAS, means of REB and
ACU
Submarine construction continued.
In 1987-88, the Navy of Sweden included four new submarines of the type Västergötland, replacing the outdated type of Draken.
Another problem of the Navy of Sweden remained their fractional capacity. These functions relied on 12 basic minesweeks of the type Arkö (1958-1964 years of construction), 6 minesweepers of the Hanö type (built in the early 1950s and from the mid-1960s were used for training cadets), as well as wooden fishing trawlers, which were mobilized during the war (‘trawlers’ of the type Fiskeminsvepare). Trawlers-trawlers were designed with the participation of military specialists, taking into account the profitability of their use in the fishing industry. Several such vessels were part of the fleet to prepare reservists, several dozen were civilian and mobilized. Despite the large number of trawlers, the high level of preparedness of reservists, the availability of ready-made weapons for mobilized trawlers, at the end of the 1970s, given the development of mines, they practically lost the ability to fight modern mines. In 1974, an experiment was constructed as a single trawler from plastic sandwich constructions. There have been a lot of research on it. In 1980, the Parliament decided to allocate additional funds for ‘development in the field of plastic technology’, the Navy decided that this should be used to develop a new mine-trapping project. He became a mine-sweeper mine in Landsort.
From 1983 to 1992, a series of 7 units was built.
Cases of minesweeper miners of type Landsort are constructed from reinforced fiberglass with the sandwich method. This significantly reduced the acoustic and magnetic fields of anti-aircraft ships and improved their protection against underwater explosions. They have on-the-spot contact and non-contact trawls, anti-aircraft GAS, remotely controlled underwater vehicles, 40mm artillery and anti-submarine bombs.
These ships were so successful that, after the completion of the series for the Navy of Sweden, another 4 were built for the Navy of Singapore.
By the way, the term ‘miner’ is outdated and does not reflect the dramatic changes in the approaches to the munitions that took place in the 1980s and 90s, as a result of which new classes of Minehunter Mine Ships (the ‘hunter for mines’ literally) and MCMV (mine countermeasures vessel – combines the capabilities of the minesweeper and minehunter). For such ships in modern Ukrainian terminology the term ‘minesweeper-miner’ is used, or simply ‘minesweeper’, which is not correct.
In the early 1990’s, Sweden corrected the imbalance of the national fleet, created a strike group, expanded anti-submarine capabilities, and rebuilt modern countervailing forces.
In 1993, the Navy of Sweden had in its composition:
12 submarines (Västergötland type 4, Näcken type 4, Sjöormen type 4);
6 corvettes (type 2 Stockholm and type 4 Göteborg)
28 rocket boats (12 types Norrköping and 16 type Hugin)
7 mines miners (not including obsolete minesweepers and fishing boats subject to mobilization).
A special Swedish handwriting of shipbuilding has also developed – the realization of the maximum opportunities in the minimum sizes, through the use of innovations and advanced, advanced technologies, as well as the involvement of civilian resources in defense.
This approach allowed the Swedes to create, without exaggeration, in the 1990-2000s unique ships that became an example for the shipbuilding of the whole world.
Mine-trap miners of the Styrsö type (4 units built in 1996-98). They are still one of the most advanced mitigation ships in the world. However, the main feature is different. These minesweepers are built with widespread use of civilian technology. Engines, electronics, navigation and other equipment were purchased on the civilian market.
This approach allows you to save money on the development of these elements and simplifies the operation of the ship.
Submarines of the Gotland type (3 units built in 1992-96). They became the first in the world modern submarines with airborne engines. With the success of the Gotland series, the Swedes also equipped similar engines and 2 VHSs of the Vastergotland type during their upgrades (the modernization was so dramatic that these submarines were allocated to a separate type – Södermanland). Swedish submarines are among the most advanced in the world.
Confirmation of this fact is that the US has leased the Gotland submarine (along with the crew) and during 2005-2007, San Diego worked out new tactical methods of combating modern submarines, and the Swedish PCH acted as an adversary on research exercises.
Corvette type Visby (5 units built in 2000-2015). In these corvette, in comparison with other ships of the world, the most fully realized technology ‘stealth’. Some consider Visby to be the first stealth ship ever. The body of these corvettes is made of hybrid composite material (sandwich construction), it absorbs and dissipates radio emission, which significantly reduces the level of the ship’s secondary radar field. Also, this case has a small electromagnetic field, which is important for mitigating actions. The Visby composite material weighs about 50% less than the equivalent steel strength. If Visby was constructed of ordinary steel, then its displacement was more than 1000 tons. The small weight of this corvette allowed him to have outstanding maneuvering characteristics. The armory of the Visby type is very powerful. They, depending on the variant (shock or antisubmarine), are able to deal with shock, antitank, countermeasures and air defenses.
According to the spectrum of tasks, this is a typical multipurpose ship, but a powerful and diverse weapon placed on such a small, invisible ship makes ‘Whiskey’ corvices unusual.
By the way, development of the concept, the creation of the necessary materials, design, construction and the introduction into the combat composition of such innovative ships, as the Visby corvette took over 20 years. The concept of the ship was worked out on a pilot boat Smyge, which was built back in 1991, the main corvette Visby was founded in 1995, launched in 2000, and state tests were completed in 2004 (9 years of construction!). After that, during 8 years up to 2012, the ship was undergoing various tests in order to develop tactics of action and methods of use of weapons, as well as testing of those weapons samples that had not been completed before the ship was completed.
Modern ships of the Navy of Sweden, this is a widespread use of new advances in science and technology, the concentration of cutting-edge technology, miniaturization, automation, the use of new materials.
Sweden does not stand still and is already developing the next corvette ‘Visby Plus’
What conclusions can be drawn from this brief retrospective of the development of the Navy of Sweden?
The exclusively ‘mosquito fleet’ (in its pure form) is a false way. The concept of the fleet, which provided for the abandonment of surface ships and the development of only combat boats, was false. It did not take into account prospects for the development of a fleet of a likely enemy. The fleet, built on such a concept, in 10 years, was not able to perform all the tasks assigned to it.
However, the construction of rocket boats has made it possible in a short time to increase its shock capabilities, and the presence of a large number of high-speed combat boats create an asymmetric threat to enemy forces.
Multipurpose ships are a necessary component of a modern fleet.
Despite the abandonment of large ships, the construction of three destroyers in Sweden was still completed. The ships of the destroyer classes – the frigate remained in the fleet (before the construction of the corvets), but had limited functions in the main to ensure the combat stability of the boat tactical groups, deploying the management system and carrying out long patrols at sea. However, since the 1980s, ships of the class corvette took an important place in the Navy of Sweden.
Sweden was forced to return to the construction of multipurpose ships in the early 1980’s.
Submarines are an effective deterrent, especially for ‘small’ fleets that operate in conditions of superiority, or even the domination of the enemy at sea.
Subsequent construction and development of submarines in Sweden did not stop, which allowed maintaining the containment factor during the absence of missile boats in the Navy.
It is necessary to build specialized minting ships. The mobilization of mobilized vessels in modern conditions does not ensure the fulfillment of the objectives of the mine defense. Classical minesweepers are not able to effectively detect and destroy modern non-contact mines, especially bottom trawls.
Such tasks are solved by minehunter, while their ability to classify trapping remains relevant (mine countermeasures vessel).
Ships are constantly outdated and need to continuously maintain them at the current level.
All warships of the Navy of Sweden, including raider minesweepers and patrol boats, regularly undergone several quite deep modernizations, as a result of which the combat properties changed so that the ships were reclassified or allocated to a separate type.
The development of the fleet should be decided at the state level. The Swedish Parliament and the Government understood the issues of defense of the state on the sea.
They constantly maintained ties directly with the Navy leadership, promptly adopted competent decisions that allowed them to react very quickly to changes in the military-political situation.
Saving is expensive. In the context of a permanent funding limitation, the Navy of Sweden paid particular attention to the development of new types of weapons and weapons in order to achieve a qualitative superiority over the enemy.
Also, the potential of the state was widely used (this applies not only to mobilization, but also to the civilian market, etc.).
The introduction of advanced technologies, modern developments in weapons and armament resulted in a fairly high cost of ships, boats and submarines of the Naval Forces of Sweden compared to the average world indicators (the ton of corpses built like Visby costs 280 thousand dollars, while the average world index for ships of the class corvette – 150 thousand dollars). In this case, some of the most advanced warships and submarines in the world were created. And their operational cost (taking into account the small size, small number of crews, the use of technical means of dual use) is relatively small.
Israel, this is another example of a country that, in a state of virtually continuous armed conflict and a series of wars including the sea, in the conditions of extremely limited resources, built a modern and efficient fleet. It is noteworthy that the Navy of Israel, which had been betting on rocket launches and submarines since the 1960s, began to develop multipurpose ships in the 1980s. The first were rocket boats of the type Saar 4.5, which, unlike the usual rocket boat, are equipped with powerful REFs and means of REB, ACS, SRS, helicopters. In 2008, two such boats got towed by GAS and anti-submarine torpedoes. Such ‘boats’ are in fact multi-purpose corvette and in size and tasks approaching the Swedish Visby. The most modern ship of the Navy of Israel is the Saar 5 type corvules. They were built in 1994-95 and equipped with artillery rockets, radar, radar, GAS, REB, anti-submarine torpedoes and ship helicopters. Now in Israel, Israel is developing a series of four Corvets Saar 6 with a displacement of 2000 tons. Israel has also continued to develop its submarine fleet and currently has 5 modern submarines and one in its construction.
Consequently, similar trends in the development of the Navy are observed in both Sweden and Israel.
Sweden and Ukraine are definitely different countries. But many useful things we can take from the Swedish experience.
We also have the common features: we are de facto non-aligned countries, our economic opportunities are limited, our seas are closed and the threats to our security are of the same origin – the Russian Federation.
Taking into account the experience of Sweden, it is possible to draw conclusions regarding the further development of the Ukrainian Navy.
Balanced fleet. It is necessary to build a fleet where all its components (multipurpose ships, rocket launches, submarine ships and submarines) are represented, only under such conditions the Ukrainian Navy will be able to provide protection of the country from the sea.
One of the components of such a fleet should be multipurpose corvettes.
The fleet of the future. To create (rebuild a fleet) appropriately chosen concept must be at least 20-25 years, so the concept should take into account the predicted changes in threats from the sea and the development of the enemy’s fleet for the next 30 years. Accordingly, to build a fleet of tomorrow from small to larger as a single integral system, where each of its elements, although built in different years, has its place and significance. Constantly adjust (not change) plans according to changes in forecasts and economic indicators. Continuously upgrade and modernize the built ships and boats.
The boat fleet is only the first, forced step. The cost of combat boats, in particular rocket launches, is not large, they can be built in the short term. For 5-7 years it is quite possible to create a shock grouping on the sea based on rocket boats. This is the only way to implement the first stage of the Ukrainian fleet renewal. Such a fleet will operate in the near sea area, capable of rapid response and creation of asymmetric threats. However, the grouping of combat boats will have significant limitations on combat stability and management flexibility, and it will not solve such critical tasks as subsea protection and anti-missile defense.
And yet, the problem of the navigability of the boat fleet: when the sea worries more than three points, such a fleet is incapacitated.
The counter-forces – are critical to our security. To purchase modern miners (we do not have the experience of building mortar ships). In order to solve the tasks of combating mine danger to attract other forces, in the first place, the PWD, PAPD.
This is also one of the priorities of fleet development in the first stage
Finish the construction of the corvette pr. 58250. The point of non-return in its construction has already been moved. Developments within the framework of the ‘Corvet’ program to use for warships of less tonnage, and the corvette itself to be used in the combat order of missile boats to increase their combat stability, air defense, management, intelligence and targeting. The corvette can be constructed without a complete set of weapons and armaments, its equipment may be gradual, in subsequent years, as weapon and weapons complexes are ready (as was the case with the Visby corvettes), or in the presence of funds (as is done by the Navy in a patrol ship
(corvette) Ślązak, which was built since 2001)
Submarines – long fleet hands. . Submarines are an integral attribute of ‘small fleets’. Only submarines are able to influence the enemy at any point of the sea, starting with their base stations. Submarines, along with rocket boats, are a powerful deterrent to the sea. We must always keep the prospect of a renewal of the Ukrainian submarine fleet.
And always aware of the threat from the enemy’s submarine fleet.
Systems of comprehensive support must be developed in parallel with the combat kernel of the fleet. Only under such conditions, combat units maximize their potential.
The systems of the rear, technical and combat support are a separate big issue.
Retaining the personnel is more expensive than automating its work. It is necessary to spend money on the creation of modern automated systems of combat management, management, accounting, communication and more fully implement a system of outsourcing.
Creating an intelligence and target pointing system is a separate direction.
This system must be developed in parallel with the naval forces to ensure the fullest possible implementation of its combat capabilities, primarily shock.
The development of a modern baseline system is critically important for the Navy. This will ensure prompt and high-quality maintenance of new ships and boats, their weapons, as well as full back support. Without a modern system of basing, it is not possible to maintain high readiness of forces for use and to ensure long service life of the ship’s warehouse. The base should be advanced ahead of time and be deployed and ready to provide new combat units before they enter the Navy.
Unfortunately, we are already late with its development (repeated negative Soviet experience in fleet development).
Pragmatic approach and rational use of the resource. Efficiency-Cost Balance. Maximize the use of dual-use equipment. New weapons and weapons should be modern and high-tech. At the same time, rely as much as possible on domestic industry. But the main thing is the defense of the state. The armed forces are not the investor, but the consumer, so if the domestic industry is not able to provide modern samples of OIW in a timely manner, then buy them from a foreign producer. We should not expect a world breakthrough in the quality and effectiveness of domestic weapons. Ukrainian Military and Industrial Complex now has great potential and high potential. But only countries with a strong advanced science and economy are able to create truly revolutionary ships and weapons.
Such countries include Sweden, but, unfortunately, so far, not Ukraine.
Last but not least:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FLOTS MUST BE GOVERNED AT THE STATE LEVEL. The development of naval forces is inextricably linked with the development of high-tech and science-intensive industries. The fleet construction process is long and requires long-term planning, which is only possible at the strategic, state level. In addition, the implementation of the shipbuilding program requires a significant amount of financial resources, which requires not only to consider them in total defense spending, but as a separate program with its own budget. The shipbuilding program should envisage not only the construction of warships (boats), but also the creation of a civilian fleet that can be mobilized or act in the interests of the state in conditions of armed struggle at sea, in addition, participation in the defense of the state must be foreseen also in the design (construction)
ships (boats) of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
Consequently, despite all of the restrictions, the non-aligned status, the presence of an enemy that is far superior to and dominant in forces and means, Sweden successfully developed its Navy, which provided protection of its interests at sea.
The command of the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has no doubt that Ukraine has sufficient and powerful potential to revive our power at sea.
List of abbreviations
Automatic control system – automated control system
VMB – naval base
Air force is an air force
GAS – hydroacoustic station
ZRK – anti-aircraft missile system
OIWT – Arms and military equipment
PKR – against a ship’s missile
PAPD – anti-submarine conversion equipment
Air defense – air defense
SAR – search and rescue
PCHO – antitrust defense
RBU – reactive bomber installation
REB – electronic warfare
RES – radio electronic meansRadar is a radar station
The navy of Sweden in the 1970s
HMS Halland
HMS Östergötland
Öland Uppland
HMS Sundsvall(F12) and Visby(F11)
Sjöormen
HMS Springaren (Draken)
Hajen sälen-valen
Norrköping-class t131-1
HMS spica-2680
Plejad
Arkö
Hanö
Fiskeminsvepare
Baltic Fleet Navy SRSR
Ships, submarines, planes and helicopters armed with the Baltic Fleet in the 1970s.
Soviet submarine S-363 on stones near the VMB of Karlskrona
Swedish Navy in the early 1990’s
Stockholm
Корвет типу Göteborg
Hugin
Norrköping
Gotland, Västergötland, Näcken, Sjöormen.
Landsort
Modern ships of the Navy of Sweden
Visby
Visby
Gotland
Gotland
Styrsö
The evolution of the Swedish surface ships from 1966 to 2002